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RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS, THIRD-PARTY HARMS,
AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE
Christopher C. Lund*
Religious exemptions are important, and sometimes required by the
Free Exercise Clause. But religious exemptions can also be troubling, and
sometimes forbidden by the Establishment Clause. It is the latter issue with
which this Essay concerns itself.
The Establishment Clause forbids religious favoritism, or at least many of
us think it does. And if that’s true, the Establishment Clause naturally prohibits religious exemptions when they amount to religious favoritism. Now
the argument that religious exemptions always amount to religious favoritism
has never persuaded the Court. It is just too obvious that one can support
religious exemptions without necessarily supporting the religious belief or
practice underlying it.1 It is not for the truth of the matter asserted, a trial
lawyer might say.
Even so, particular religious exemptions might still violate the Establishment Clause. One might think, for example, of the parsonage allowance.2
But that may not be the best example, because it might be too easy. The
parsonage allowance is a tax exemption rather than a regulatory one, and (at
least from one perspective) tax exemption is equivalent to government subsidy, and government subsidy of clergy implicates the core of the Establish© 2016 Christopher C. Lund. Individuals and nonprofit institutions may reproduce
and distribute copies of this Article in any format at or below cost, for educational
purposes, so long as each copy identifies the author, provides a citation to the
Notre Dame Law Review, and includes this provision in the copyright notice.
* Associate Professor of Law, Wayne State University Law School. For helpful
comments, I would like to thank Marc DeGirolami, Chad Flanders, Fred Gedicks, John
Inazu, Micah Schwartzman, Nelson Tebbe, Jon Weinberg, as well as all those in attendance
at the symposium who gave thoughtful feedback.
1 To give just one example, the Supreme Court unanimously protected the use of
hoasca when used sacramentally by a small Brazilian religious group, even though presumably no one on the Court uses hoasca or thinks it efficacious in worship. See Gonzales v. O
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418 (2006).
2 The parsonage allowance, 26 U.S.C. § 107 (2012), allows ministers to deduct the
fair-rental value of their homes from their income. It is broader than the exemption available to anyone whose job requires them to live in employer-provided housing, 26 U.S.C.
§ 119, because clergy can deduct the value of their home regardless of how much they use
it for work.
1375
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ment Clause.3 But one could imagine a regulatory exemption that amounts
to religious favoritism. An exemption sufficiently disconnected from the protection of religious exercise—a modern benefit-of-clergy statute, for example, that exempted ministers from the murder laws—would seem to be a
solid case of that.4 None of this seems all that controversial.
But now a different question, which raises a different conception of the
Establishment Clause: When are religious exemptions improper or unconstitutional because they burden third parties? This issue of third-party harms
has received a lot of attention,5 especially in light of Hobby Lobby.6 Hobby
Lobby initially sought an exemption from the contraceptive mandate that
would have come at the expense of their employees, who would have then
lacked insurance coverage for certain forms of contraception. The employees would have had, in essence, to shoulder the cost of someone else’s religious commitments.
The general principle here—that burdens on third parties matter—is
well established. It fits with common sense; it accords with long-established
free exercise notions of what counts as a compelling governmental interest.
It also fits with well-established Establishment Clause precedent. In Cutter v.
Wilkinson, following longstanding precedent, a unanimous Court said plainly
that religious exemptions must “take adequate account of the burdens . . .
impose[d] on nonbeneficiaries.”7 That seems to answer it.
I.

FOUR FACTORS

Even so, much of the debate thus far has been about whether this thirdparty harm principle exists rather than what it might mean. Disagreements
over baseline issues have taken up a lot of attention.8 Take Hobby Lobby. One
3 Insiders know how the Supreme Court has gone back and forth on the issue of
whether tax exemptions should be equated with monetary grants for Establishment Clause
purposes. Sometimes the Court has emphasized their similarities. See Texas Monthly, Inc.
v. Bullock, 489 U.S. 1, 14 (1989); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591
(1983). Sometimes the Court has emphasized their differences. See Mueller v. Allen, 463
U.S. 388, 396 n.6 (1983); Walz v. Tax Comm’n, 397 U.S. 664, 675 (1970).
4 “Benefit of clergy” originally allowed clergy to claim they were outside the jurisdiction of the secular courts and thus should be tried by the (usually) more lenient ecclesiastical courts. Benefit of clergy declined slowly as various limitations were placed on it.
Benefit of clergy was abolished for murder, for example, under King Henry VII. See An
Acte to Make Some Offence Petty Treason, 1496, 12 Hen. 7 c. 7 (Eng.), reprinted in 2 THE
STATUTES OF THE REALM 639 (1819).
5 See, e.g., Frederick Mark Gedicks & Rebecca G. Van Tassell, RFRA Exemptions from the
Contraception Mandate: An Unconstitutional Accommodation of Religion, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 343 (2014); Frederick Mark Gedicks & Andrew Koppelman, Invisible Women: Why an
Exemption for Hobby Lobby Would Violate the Establishment Clause, 67 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 51
(2014).
6 Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014).
7 Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 720 (2005) (citations and quotations omitted).
8 See, e.g., Marc O. DeGirolami, On the Claim That Exemptions from the Contraception
Mandate Violate the Establishment Clause, CTR. FOR L. & RELIGION F. (Dec. 5, 2013), http://
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side says the baseline is the Affordable Care Act, and that any religious
exemption to it therefore imposes discrete harm on workers. The other side
says the baseline is the situation before the Affordable Care Act, as the objection in Hobby Lobby is directed at the Act itself, seeing it as a violation of
religious conscience.
This dispute deserves the attention it has gotten. But this Essay will
accept that third-party harms matter.9 (Otherwise this Essay will be over
before it starts.) It turns instead to the practical details of the theory. And
while this piece is a quick and rough examination of the issue, this Essay will
suggest four factors relevant to the issue of third-party harms.
A.

The Magnitude of the Third-Party Harm

The first is perhaps the most obvious and the most important—how
severely are third parties injured by the religious exemption in question?
How heavy is the third-party burden? This was one of the points stressed in
Hobby Lobby, when scholars pointed out how severely the religious exemption
would affect the female employees of Hobby Lobby.10 The greater the thirdparty harm, the more problematic the religious exemption becomes. The
difficulty here, of course, will be in categorizing the various kinds of harms
and in figuring out how much harm is too much. Caldor spoke of “significant” burdens.11 But the significance of a burden is more of a spectral variable than a dichotomous one, and there will be no clear boundary between
significant and insignificant burdens. One wonderful little recent case, reminiscent of Joel Feinberg’s old bus hypothetical,12 involves an Establishment
Clause challenge to a local noise ordinance that exempted church bells.13
The plaintiff said the bells had wrecked his marriage;14 it is not clear whether
clrforum.org/2013/12/05/on-the-claim-that-exemptions-from-the-contraception-mandateviolate-the-establishment-clause/; Nelson Tebbe, Richard Schragger & Micah Schwartzman, Hobby Lobby and the Establishment Clause, Part II: What Counts as a Burden on Employees?,
BALKINIZATION (Dec. 4, 2013), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2013/12/hobby-lobby-andestablishment-clause.html; Eugene Volokh, Prof. Michael McConnell (Stanford) on the Hobby
Lobby Arguments, WASH. POST: VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Mar. 27, 2014), https://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2014/03/27/prof-michael-mcconnell-stanford-on-the-hobby-lobby-arguments/; Kevin C. Walsh, A Baseline Problem for the
“Burden on Employees” Argument Against RFRA-Based Exemptions from the Contraceptives Mandate, MIRROR OF JUSTICE (Jan. 17, 2014), http://mirrorofjustice.blogs.com/mirrorofjustice/
2014/01/a-baseline-problem-for-the-burden-on-employees-argument-against-rfra-basedexemptions-from-the-contr.html.
9 Even the Court in Hobby Lobby took this as settled. See Hobby Lobby, 134 S. Ct. at 2781
n.37 (citing Cutter, 544 U.S. at 720).
10 See, e.g., Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 5, at 375–79.
11 Estate of Thornton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 710 (1985).
12 JOEL FEINBERG, OFFENSE TO OTHERS: THE MORAL LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL LAW 10–13
(1985).
13 Devaney v. Kilmartin, 88 F. Supp. 3d 34 (D.R.I. 2015).
14 Id. at 40 (“The impact of this accumulation of sound on Mr. Devaney has been
catastrophic: despite no air-conditioning, he is forced to keep the storm windows closed
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the district judge took this claim seriously or not.15 But the case prompts
useful questions about what harms should count. Is the sound of church
bells too trifling to count as a harm? On the other hand, doesn’t it matter
how loud they are? In any event, the questions with this first factor may be
difficult but they are relatively straightforward. What kinds of harms to third
parties count? Which kinds of harms are the most severe? And how much
harm is too much?
B.

The Likelihood of the Third-Party Harm

Just as the magnitude of the threatened harm is important, so too is the
likelihood of it actually happening. Holt v. Hobbs, the Supreme Court’s
recent case about beard-length restrictions in prison, is precisely this kind of
case.16 Arkansas raised security concerns as a reason for denying Gregory
Holt permission to wear a half-inch beard; Arkansas saw his beard as a threat
to prison guards and other inmates.17 But the Court decided that those
threatened harms—which were certainly serious enough—were just not sufficiently likely to happen.18 Perhaps religious draft exemptions can be
explained the same way. The likelihood of you being drafted because someone else got an exemption is infinitesimal; it is barely more than the risk you
had originally of being drafted.19 And related here is a point about the
spread of third-party burdens. Even large burdens, if sufficiently diffused over
enough people, do not seem all that troubling. The aggregate cost of the
Bureau of Prisons providing Kosher meals to inmates may be enormous, but
it is spread over all federal taxpayers and so any individual’s share will be
quite small.
and to wear earplugs, his marriage has collapsed and he has been alienated from his
children.”).
15 After describing the plaintiff’s allegations, the judge refers to the plaintiff’s “understandable rage at the Churches,” id. at 56 (footnote omitted), but then says,
“[u]nderstandable, of course, based on the assumption that the facts alleged in his pleading are true, as this Court must assume when assessing whether the Second Amended
Complaint states a claim.” Id. at 56 n.18.
16 135 S. Ct. 853 (2015). Of course, Holt v. Hobbs was a RLUIPA case and not an
Establishment Clause case. But the facts of this case are helpful and well known, and it
seems obvious that the Court did not think the religious exemption at stake would violate
the Establishment Clause.
17 See id. at 859–61.
18 Justice Alito joked at oral argument about a prisoner using his half-inch beard to
conceal a revolver. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 49, Holt, 135 S. Ct. 853 (No. 136827) (“[A]s far as searching a beard is concerned, why can’t the prison just give the
inmate a comb, you could develop whatever kind of comb you want, and say comb your
beard, and if there’s anything in there, if there’s a SIM card in there or a revolver or
anything else you think . . . can be hidden in a [half-inch] beard, a tiny revolver, it’ll fall
out.”).
19 See Gedicks & Van Tassell, supra note 5, at 367 (noting this is “a slight, marginal
increase in the large preexisting risk of being drafted”).
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As an even clearer example of the likelihood factor coming into play,
consider a thorny and fascinating issue arising in child-custody cases between
divorced parents when one is a Jehovah’s Witness and the other is not. Jehovah’s Witnesses refuse blood transfusions for religious reasons. And in these
custody proceedings, this creates a logical and almost irresistible line of
attack: if the child gets sick, he might end up needing a blood transfusion,
and she might not give it to him because she’s a Jehovah’s Witness, and he
could die. Now it is rightly settled that parents cannot legally deny blood
transfusions to their minor children.20 (This, of course, is yet another manifestation of our third-party-harm principle at work.) But a problem arises
because this argument takes place routinely in custody disagreements even
when the child is perfectly healthy and when there is no solid evidence the
religious parent would try to deny the child a blood transfusion anyway.
Courts here have rejected the third-party burden argument not because the
threatened harm to third parties is insufficiently grave but because it is insufficiently likely.21
C.

The Religious Interest at Stake

A third factor is the magnitude of the religious interest on the other
side. A strong religious interest in an exemption justifies more of a burden
being placed on third parties. This becomes clear when one considers the
cases together. Compare, for example, the employees in Hobby Lobby with
those in Amos.22 The potential harm to the employees in Hobby Lobby was the
20 See B. Jessie Hill, Medical Decision Making by and on Behalf of Adolescents: Reconsidering
First Principles, 15 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 37, 45–46 (2012) (“Parents have authority to
consent to, or withhold consent for, health care for their children that is routine but not,
strictly speaking, medically necessary. . . . But with medical treatment that is required to
prevent serious harm to the child, it may be accurate to say that parents both can and must
consent on behalf of their children.” (footnote omitted)).
21 This issue receives surprisingly little academic attention given the frequency of the
cases in the lower courts. Courts have rightly insisted on some amount of evidentiary proof
before taking away custody on this ground. See, e.g., Harrison v. Tauheed, 256 P.3d 851,
867 (Kan. 2011) (“It would not have been appropriate for [the district judge] to speculate
about an unlikely future event; and, in fact, Monica [the Jehovah’s Witness parent] testified that she would consult Adiel [the non-Jehovah’s Witness parent] in the event a blood
transfusion was recommended for J.D.H. . . . [And] Adiel would be empowered to consent
to the treatment for his minor son.”); Garrett v. Garrett, 527 N.W.2d 213, 221 (Neb. Ct.
App. 1995) (“[N]o evidence was presented showing that any of the minor children were
prone to accidents or were plagued with any sort of affliction that might necessitate a
blood transfusion in the near future. We cannot decide this case based on some hypothetical future accident or illness which might necessitate such treatment.”); Varnum v.
Varnum, 586 A.2d 1107, 1112 (Vt. 1990) (“We are also concerned about the use of the
finding that defendant would not allow her children to have blood transfusions even if
medically necessary, in the absence of any evidence that such an eventuality is likely and
cannot be resolved in ways other than depriving defendant of custody.” (citations
omitted)).
22 Corp. of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints v.
Amos, 483 U.S. 327 (1987) (upholding, from Establishment Clause challenge, the federal
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loss of part of the contraceptive coverage provided by their medical insurance. But the employees in Amos lost their jobs and everything that came
with them: their contraceptive coverage if any, their medical insurance, their
retirement benefits, and (most importantly) their salaries. The same thing
was true in Hosanna-Tabor, where the Court said that the Establishment
Clause did not just allow the ministerial exception but required it.23 The
third-party burden in Hobby Lobby was thus a lesser-included case of the thirdparty burden in both Amos and Hosanna-Tabor. But the Court unanimously
upheld the religious exemption in the latter two cases. That could mean that
the Establishment Clause claim in Hobby Lobby is frivolous. But a better way
of thinking about it is that the religious interest at stake in cases like Amos
and Hosanna-Tabor is more serious. And the more serious the religious interest, the more of a third-party burden it justifies.
One can see this point a different way by viewing Amos from another
angle. Remember that Amos upheld a statute shielding religious organizations from claims of religious discrimination in employment.24 But some
states go further, immunizing religious organizations from all claims of discrimination—race, gender, disability, etc.25 Courts rightly see the latter
immunities as creating much more of a constitutional concern, even though
from the employee’s perspective, they involve the same third-party harm.26
As a final example of this point, return to Hobby Lobby and recall how
certain highly religious nonprofits—like churches and associations of
churches—were, from the very beginning, exempt entirely from the contraceptive mandate.27 Few think that exemption violates the Establishment
Clause, though it too creates precisely the same burden on third parties. Part
of this relates back to our first factor (the magnitude of the third-party
harm), in the sense that fewer women at these highly religious institutions
will want to use the prohibited forms of contraception. But if there is a single
woman working at a church who wants them—and surely there is—then she
suffers precisely the same third-party harm as an employee denied contraception by Hobby Lobby. So part of the analysis must also be about the strength
of the religious interest in obtaining an exemption.28
statute that shields religious organizations from claims of religious discrimination by all
employees, ministerial or non-ministerial).
23 Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. v. EEOC, 132 S. Ct. 694
(2012).
24 Amos, 483 U.S. at 339.
25 See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE § 49.60.040(11) (2015) (“‘Employer’ includes any person
acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, who employs eight or more
persons, and does not include any religious or sectarian organization not organized for
private profit.”).
26 See, e.g., Ockletree v. Franciscan Health Sys., 317 P.3d 1009, 1020 (Wash. 2014)
(upholding the exemption discussed in footnote 25).
27 See Exemption and Accommodations in Connection with Coverage of Preventative
Health Services, 45 C.F.R. § 147.131(a) (2014).
28 In his Hobby Lobby brief, in discussing the exemption of highly religious employers,
the Solicitor General emphasized both the strength of the religious interest and the less-
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Exemptions Made for Nonreligious Reasons

Also relevant are the secular exemptions made by the law in question.
Now when secular exemptions are enough to create a right of religious
exemption under the Free Exercise Clause is a highly contested matter—at
some point, if there are enough of them, the law is no longer generally applicable. But when secular exemptions are enough to protect an existing religious exemption from Establishment Clause invalidation is a different issue
altogether.
Again take Hobby Lobby, where scholars contended that the sought-after
religious exemption would have unconstitutionally burdened third parties.
The existing exceptions for small employers and grandfathered plans,29
which limited the health coverage of millions of employees,30 are surely relevant to the Establishment Clause issue. The more secular exceptions there
are, the more understandable a religious exemption becomes.
II.

THREE QUESTIONS

This Essay has tried to sketch a theory of what factors might enter into
the analysis of when religious exemptions violate the Establishment Clause.
It ends with a sketch of three general questions that any theory of third-party
harms will have to address, at least at some point.
A.

A Concern About Balancing

Any theory of third-party harms will have to involve a number of considerations, and above, this Essay has sketched out some likely candidates. But
the very fact that a number of considerations will inevitably be involved raises
an important concern about balancing. Employment Division v. Smith31 abanened nature of the third-party harm. See Brief for the Petitioners at 51–52, Sebelius v.
Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751 (2014) (No. 13-354), 2014 WL 173486, at *51–52
(“The regulatory exemption for religious employers extends to ‘churches and other
houses of worship’ and their integrated auxiliaries. . . . [T]here is a long tradition of protecting the autonomy of a church through exemptions of this kind. The Religion Clauses
of the First Amendment give ‘special solicitude to the rights of religious organizations as
religious organizations . . . .’ [And] [i]n establishing the religious-employer exemption,
the Departments explained that ‘[h]ouses of worship and their integrated auxiliaries that
object to contraceptive coverage on religious grounds are more likely than other employers to employ people of the same faith who share the same objection.’” (citations and
quotations omitted)).
29 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, §§ 1251,
1304(b), 1513, 124 Stat. 119, 161–62, 172, 253–56 (2010) (codified as amended at 42
U.S.C. §§ 18011, 18024 (2012); 26 U.S.C. § 4980H (2012)).
30 See, e.g., Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2764 (2014) (“Over
one-third of the 149 million nonelderly people in America with employer-sponsored health
plans were enrolled in grandfathered plans in 2013. The count for employees working for
firms that do not have to provide insurance at all because they employ fewer than 50
employees is 34 million workers.”).
31 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
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doned judicially required exemptions in significant part because the Court
was so convinced of the inappropriateness of judicial balancing.32 Smith
openly feared judges trying to balance the need for a religious exemption
against the harm created by a religious exemption. But any theory of thirdparty harm will require exactly this kind of balancing. Now for those who
think Smith was a mistake, that will probably not be much of a problem. But
the defenders of Smith will be harder to convince, especially now, with some
of the concerns (like respect for democratic decisionmaking) on the other
foot.
B.

A Concern About Justification

The third-party harm argument seems intuitive at first glance; that people should not bear the cost of other peoples’ religious exercise seems quite
natural and, at some level, must be right. Even so, when we think about it
more, there is reason to pause, for legislatures distribute and redistribute
burdens all the time—that is the very stuff of legislation. We are routinely
expected to bear each other’s burdens; remember again Hobby Lobby arises
only because of the Green family’s objections to bearing the burden of providing someone else’s contraceptive coverage. But a theory of third-party
burdens grounded in the Establishment Clause requires that religious exercise be singled out for disadvantageous treatment. And phrasing it that way
provides an occasion for further reflection.
Take again the Establishment Clause issue in Hobby Lobby, and consider
the existing legislative exceptions for small employers and grandfathered
plans. This raises a question: If Congress can legitimately worry about the
burdens ACA imposes on small businesses (i.e., the small-employer exception33) and if Congress can legitimately worry about various problems potentially arising from overly rapid onset of the ACA (i.e., the grandfathered-plan
exception34), why can’t Congress also legitimately worry about the free exercise of religion? And don’t just consider the exemptions that Congress actually made. Think about the exemptions Congress could have made. If
Congress wanted to exempt McDonald’s from the contraceptive mandate,
that would have been fine—fine under anyone’s theory of the Establishment
Clause. Women working at McDonald’s would have suffered precisely the
same third-party harm as feared in Hobby Lobby, but they would have had no
legal complaint. Congress could, this argument goes, exempt any business
from the mandate and for any reason, as long as that reason isn’t a concern
about the free exercise of religion.
And, of course, this isn’t just about the mandate. Legislatures are in the
business of protecting interests. This Establishment Clause argument
32 See, e.g., id. at 889 n.5 (“[I]t is horrible to contemplate that federal judges will regularly balance against the importance of general laws the significance of religious
practice.”).
33 See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, §§ 1304(b), 1513.
34 See id. § 1251.
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presumes that legislatures can care about any secular interest; they can care
about any secular interest to any degree; they can care about any secular
interest and impose any kind of third-party harms in pursuit of it—subject
only, presumably, to the minimal constraints of the rational-basis test. The
one thing that legislatures cannot do is care about free exercise in the same
way. Religious liberty is thus relegated to the lowest rung of human values,
for it is the only value for which legislatures cannot impose burdens on
others. And all this may even be right, but such powerfully distinctive treatment should require an equally powerful set of justifications.
C.

A Concern About Practical Implications

Theories of third-party harm will also have to deal with existing religious
exemptions. Now RFRA is sufficiently malleable to incorporate third-partyharm concerns internally. Accommodations required by RFRA by definition
will not violate the Establishment Clause, because any religious accommodation that would violate the Establishment Clause will not be required by
RFRA in the first place. But particular religious exemptions will have to be
considered in light of our theory. And either the theory will have to square
with the exemption, or the exemption will have to fall in light of the theory.
And many long-established religious exemptions impose real harm on
others, or at least seem to do so. Take the priest-penitent privilege.35 Consider a tort case where a plaintiff wants a priest’s testimony—say the defendant has confessed the bad act to the priest—and the plaintiff might lose the
case (and thus thousands of dollars) without it. That is a serious third-party
harm. But of course, that third-party harm is only half the story. The alternative is pretty ugly too. We would have to force a priest to testify about what
happened in the confessional against his will and against his conscience,
which would simultaneously implicate a whole host of concerns—concerns
about religious intensity (for Catholics, confession is sacramental and sacraments are at the heart of Catholicism), concerns about futility (the Catholic
clergy would probably not comply even if held in contempt), concerns about
religious nondiscrimination (confession may not be a sacrament for Protestants or Jews, but they too respect clerical confidences and the law is rightly
afraid of drawing lines between faiths), and concerns about the host of ostensibly similar other privileges (between spouses, between doctors and patients,
between attorneys and clients). Similar questions about third-party harm
could be directed at draft exemptions: religious conscientious objectors have
long been protected from the draft, but if objectors are replaced by drafted
substitutes, that third-party burden is extraordinary.
Those are two of the most salient examples, but there are many others.
Legislative accommodations for religious exercise are all over the place, and
they often impose third-party burdens. There are exemptions for churches
35 For a thoughtful overview of the privilege, see Mockaitis v. Harcleroad, 104 F.3d
1522, 1531–34 (9th Cir. 1997).
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from ERISA,36 from the Social Security Act,37 from the Americans with Disabilities Act,38 and from the Copyright Act.39 What happens to them? And
what about the exemptions courts have given out? What about the exemptions given in Yoder40 and Gonzales?41 And what about the exemptions at
stake in Lyng42 and Lee,43 which were rejected by the Court but granted subsequently by Congress?44 The list goes on and on: one will need to sit down
with a list of religious exemptions to think through the ramifications.
III.

A PLEA

FOR

FURTHER THOUGHT

Third-party burdens are an important consideration with regard to religious exemptions. Frankly, third-party burdens are important everywhere.
Central to questions of every constitutional right are the harms that a right
imposes on others. Hate speech causes genuine harm to others; firearms
cause genuine harm to others. The main hesitation about the right established in New York Times Co. v. Sullivan45 is harm to others, and that is true
too for cases as diverse as Roe v. Wade46 and Maryland v. Craig.47
It is tempting to say that constitutional rights are fine as long as they
impose no harm on others. It is tempting, but it cannot survive scrutiny.
Constitutional rights always involve some degree of harm to others.48 And
our willingness to tolerate that harm depends heavily on context. We once
accepted that white suburban families would have to bus their kids to distant
and sometimes difficult schools because desegregation was critically impor36 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(33), 1003(b)(2) (2012).
37 See 26 U.S.C. § 3121(w) (2012).
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 12187 (2012).
39 See 17 U.S.C. § 110(3) (2012).
40 Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 234 (1972) (exempting the Amish from having to
send their children to public schools until the age of sixteen).
41 Gonzales v. O Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 425, 439
(2006) (exempting the UDV from the Schedule I prohibition of DMT).
42 See Lyng v. Nw. Indian Cemetery Protective Ass’n, 485 U.S. 439, 441–42 (1988).
43 See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982).
44 See Smith River National Recreation Area Act, Pub. L. No. 101-612, 104 Stat. 3209
(1990) (codified at 16 U.S.C. § 460bbb (2012)) (protecting the contested area in Lyng);
Technical and Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, 102 Stat. 3342,
3781 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 3127(a) (2012)) (effectively overruling Lee).
45 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
46 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
47 497 U.S. 836 (1990).
48 For such a claim in the context of free speech, see Frederick Schauer, Must Speech Be
Special?, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1284, 1294 (1983) (arguing that if we “accept the principle that
speech may be restricted when it causes harm to others . . . then what is the point of a
principle of free speech?” as “it is hard to think of any first amendment case in which the
communicative acts at issue did not cause some degree of harm . . . .” (citation omitted)).
For such a claim in the context of free exercise, see Douglas Laycock, A Syllabus of Errors,
105 MICH. L. REV. 1169, 1171 (2007) (“The no-harm principle sounds plausible on first
reading, but it cannot withstand analysis.”).
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tant;49 now we have so much trouble accepting that some students might not
get into their preferred college that the Court may toss out affirmative action
altogether.50 Questions of whether (and how much) I have to pay for your
rights are intractable. They will always be with us.
Religious exemptions are, and always have been, matters of degree. Everyone agrees that religious exemptions that impose significant burdens on
nonconsenting third parties can be improper and perhaps unconstitutional.
But we need to do more to unpack this widely held sentiment if this idea is
going to get off the ground. This piece has sketched out a number of relevant factors that will have to be pondered, and a number of issues that will
have to be thought through. This short symposium piece leaves almost nothing answered, instead looking forward to the contributions of others in the
years to come.

49 See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
50 See Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 758 F.3d 633 (5th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 135 S.
Ct. 2888 (2015).
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